This paper studies an untrusted relay channel, in which the destination sends artificial noise simultaneously with the source sending a message to the relay, in order to protect the source's confidential message. The traditional amplify-andforward (AF) scheme shows poor performance in this situation because of the interference power dilemma. Providing better security by using stronger artificial noise will consume more power of the relay, impairing the confidential message's transmission. To solve this problem, this paper proposes a moduloand-forward (MF) operation at the relay with nested lattice encoding at the source. For the proposed MF scheme with full channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT), theoretical analysis shows that the MF scheme approaches the secrecy capacity within 1/2 bit for all channel realizations, and, hence, achieves full generalized security degrees of freedom (G-SDoF). In contrast, the AF scheme can only achieve a small fraction of the G-SDoF. For the MF scheme without CSIT, the total outage event, defined as either connection outage or secrecy outage, is introduced. Based on this total outage definition, analysis shows that the proposed MF scheme achieves the full generalized secure diversity gain (G-SDG) of order one. On the other hand, the AF scheme can achieve a G-SDG of only 1/2 at most.
others on the wire-tap channel. The basic idea of physical-layer security is to exploit the destination's advantages (e.g, better channel quality) over the eavesdropper. More recent works have investigated this problem in fading channels, including analyses of the fading secrecy capacity [4] , [5] and the secrecy outage probability [6] , [7] . On the other hand, new coding and modulation schemes have been proposed to achieve physicallayer security, including Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) codes in [8] and [9] , nested lattice codes in [10] and [11] , and nested polar codes in [12] and [13] .
In recent years, several extended models of the wire-tap channel have been studied and one of these is the untrusted relay channel. In the untrusted relay channel, the source relies on a relay node to forward information to the destination, while keeping the transmitted information confidential from the relay. An example is the two-way untrusted relay channel with two-phase physical-layer network coding [14] , [15] , in which the superimposed signals at the relay protect each other's information with minimal rate loss compared to the trusted channel capacity [16] , [17] . Similar ideas have been applied in the one-way untrusted relay channel in which the destination artificially transmits some interference to the relay while the source is transmitting. Depending on the processing at the relay, such schemes can be classified into two categories. The first category is amplify-and-forward (AF), in which the relay simply amplifies the received signal under its power constraint and then forwards it to the destination [18] , [19] . Although AF is simple to implement, its performance is severely limited by the interference power dilemma: more power of the relay is wasted on forwarding the interfering signal (which is useless to the destination) when the destination transmits with larger power to protect the confidential message; alternatively the confidential message is less well protected when the destination transmits with smaller power. The other category is decode-and-forward (DF) [20] , in which both the source signal and interference signal are encoded by the same lattice code and arrive at the relay in perfect synchrony. 1 Then, the relay performs lattice decoding on the received signal to obtain a noiseless codeword (a modulo summation of the source lattice codeword and the interfering lattice codeword) for transmitting in the second phase. The DF scheme performs better than the AF scheme in the high SNR region but performs worse in the low SNR region, despite the cost of perfect synchronization. Schemes extending these ideas to multiple channels and fading channels can be found in many works, such as [21] [22] [23] .
To counter the shortcomings of these existing techniques and inspired by the modulo-lattice additive noise (MLAN) channel [24] in which modulo processing at the receiver loses very little information, here we propose a novel moduloand-forward (MF) scheme at the relay. In this scheme, the confidential message from the source node is encoded with a nested lattice code [10] while the artificial interference message from the destination is Gaussian. When the two messages arrive at the relay node simultaneously, the relay maps the superimposed signal with a modulo operation according to the source lattice. As a result, the total power of the new message is reduced to that of the source lattice, with almost no loss of useful information. In this way, the proposed MF scheme solves the interference power dilemma of the AF scheme by relaying a signal with only the source power, without relation to the interference power. Moreover, MF does not require perfect synchronization as in the DF scheme.
We analyze the secure performance of this MF scheme for two different cases. For Gaussian channels with full channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT), our analysis shows that the MF scheme approaches the secrecy capacity of the untrusted relay channel within 1/2 bit for all channel realizations; hence it achieves the full generalized secure degrees of freedom (G-SDoF), while the AF scheme can achieve only a small fraction of the G-SDoF. The achievable secrecy rate of MF is even better than that of DF, which as noted above requires finer synchronization.
For fading channels without any CSIT, we characterize the total outage probability, which includes the connection outage probability at the destination and the secrecy outage probability at the relay node [7] . Beyond achieving a smaller outage probability as expected, the MF scheme achieves essential improvement over the AF scheme. Defining the generalized secure diversity as the rate with which the total outage probability goes to zero in the high SNR region, our analysis shows that the MF scheme achieves full diversity gain of 1 as long as the ratio of the destination signal power to the source signal power goes to infinity. The AF scheme, however, can only achieve a diversity gain of 1/2 at most, due to the interference power dilemma.
The contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) The MF Scheme: We propose the lattice code based modulo-and-forward scheme for the untrusted relay channel. This scheme is of practical interest since it only needs symbol level time synchronization and low complexity processing to attain much better performance than other schemes.
2) Analysis of the Secure Capacity and G-SDoF in
Gaussian Channels: In Gaussian channels with full CSIT, we prove that the MF scheme approaches the secrecy capacity within one-half bit for any channel realization. Hence, the MF scheme achieves the full G-SDoF, while the AF scheme only achieves a very small fraction of the G-SDoF. 3) Analysis of the Secure Diversity in Fading Channels: In fading channels without CSIT, the MF scheme achieves the full generalized secure diversity gain (G-SDG) value of 1, while the AF scheme only Fig. 1 . System model for the untrusted relay channel. In the first phase, the source S sends a lattice signal and the destination D sends artificial noise; in the second phase, the untrusted relay R performs a modulo operation on the received signal before forwarding it . achieves a G-SDG of 1/2 due to the interference power dilemma. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the detailed untrusted relay model and the notation used therein. For the proposed modulo-and-forward scheme, Section III elaborates the encoding process at the source node, the forwarding process at the relay node and the decoding process at the destination node.
Under the assumption of full CSIT, Section IV analyzes the achievable rate and the G-SDoF of the MF scheme, with a comparison to the AF and DF schemes. Under the assumption of no CSIT, Section V analyzes the connection outage and secrecy outage probabilities, as well as the system secure diversity gain. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper. Fig. 1 shows the system model for the considered untrusted relay channel, where the source S needs to transmit a confidential message to the destination D with R working as a relay without a direct link between S and D. All nodes are equipped with single antennas, and operate in a time-division half-duplex mode. In this setting, although the source relies on the relay to forward the message, it does not trust the relay and would like to keep the confidential information secret from the relay. This model can find application in many practical scenarios such as renting a satellite from a third party to relay confidential messages.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
To prevent eavesdropping at R, an artificial interference scheme is proposed. Specifically, the destination D sends a signal to interfere with reception at the relay, while the source is transmitting to the relay. In the second phase, the relay sends the corrupted source signal to the destination, where it can be recovered since the destination has full information about the interfering signal. This two-phase transmission is similar to physical layer network coding as described in [14] . The data transmission process is detailed as follows.
Before transmission, the source encodes its information with secure encoding schemes, such as those described in [2] , [10] , and [12] . Essentially, all the schemes can be described as follows. At S, the length-L 1 binary confidential message v, together with one random binary sequence with length L 2 − L 1 ≥ 0, is mapped to one error correction codeword belonging to a set with cardinality 2 L 2 . Here, the mapping is a one-to-one mapping and its rule is pre-known to all nodes, although the random sequence itself is not known to either R or D before reception. The key point inside the codeword mapping is that the random sequence is always easier to decode than v. By doing so, the relay R, experiencing a poorer channel due to the artificial interference, can only decode the random sequence (its channel capacity can only afford to decode the random sequence and cannot decode v) while D, with a better channel condition, can decode both the random sequence and the confidential message v. An example of this encoder is the polar code [12] , which can make some information bits easier to decode than the others.
After secure encoding at the source, the data transmission will operate in two phases as shown in Fig. 1 . Specifically, the first phase is a multiple access transmission, in which the source S transmits x s with power P s to the relay, and at the same time, D transmits a Gaussian interference signal x d with power P d . Hence the relay receives a superimposed signal
where h i ∼ CN (0, ε i ) denotes the instantaneous channel coefficient of the i -th hop (i = 1, 2) in the multiple access phase, and n r ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ) is additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the relay.
Recall that the relay is untrusted, and we hope to keep the confidential information secret from the relay. Therefore, the relay must not be able to correctly decode v from y r . On the other hand, the relay is willing to forward the message to the destination. So it will process y r to make the transmission to D more efficient. We denote the message sent from the relay by x r , with the same average power constraint P s . 2 The second phase is a point-to-point forwarding transmission, where R transmits x r to the destination D. As a result, the received signal at D can be expressed as
where n d ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ) is AWGN at the destination and the corresponding channel coefficient is also h 2 under the assumption of reciprocity. Let g i = |h i | 2 be the instantaneous channel gain of the i -th hop (i ∈ {1, 2}). For an amplify-and-forward relay scheme, x r = τ y r with the normalizing coefficient τ = P s P s g 1 +P d g 2 +σ 2 . Although the artificial interference x d protects the confidential message from eavesdropping at R, it also degrades the performance of the useful information at the destination since it decreases the normalizing coefficient τ via the term P d therein. Better protection with larger P d also consumes more power at the relay, which is the interference power dilemma, as noted above. To solve this dilemma, i.e., to overcome the detrimental effects of the artificial interference and keep its beneficial effects at the same time, we propose a modulo-and-forward scheme as detailed in the next section.
III. MODULO-AND-FORWARD SCHEME
In the amplify-and-forward scheme, a good part of the relay's power is used to convey the interference, which is totally useless for the destination D. To counter this problem, we propose a modulo-and-forward scheme, in which the relay processes y r with a modulo operation before forwarding it. This scheme is detailed following a brief introduction of lattices.
A. Preliminary Introduction to Lattices
For completeness, this subsection briefly introduces some basic definitions relating to lattices; a detailed introduction can be found in [25] . A lattice, , is usually defined as the length-L points generated from all the integer linear combinations of a basis G = [g 1 |g 2 | · · · , g L ], g i ∈ R L , as
For a lattice , its fundamental Voronoi region V, is defined as the set of points in R L closest to the origin. Then, the nearest neighbor quantization of a vector x ∈ R L , associated with , is defined as
Now, we can give the definition of the modulo-operation as
As shown in [25] , there exist lattices which are Rogers-good, Poltyrev-good, good for quantization and AWGN-good at the same time, when L goes to infinity. A lattice with such good properties can approach capacity on point-to-point Gaussian channels.
B. Nested Lattice Encoding at S
We consider a nested lattice coding scheme as in [10] . Let ( , 0 , 1 ) be good nested lattices such that 1 ⊂ 0 ⊂ , and their associated fundamental Voronoi regions are denoted by V 1 , V 0 , and V, respectively. Obviously, is the finest lattice, 1 is the coarsest lattice and 0 is in-between. All points in the lattices are length-L vectors. The nested lattices are carefully selected so that their Voronoi regions satisfy the following conditions. The average power of points in V 1 is P s ; the codebook C = { ∩ V 0 } has a cardinality of |C| = 2 L 1 , and there is a one-to-one mapping between each codeword in C and each confidential message v; and the codebook C = { 0 ∩ V 1 } has a cardinality of |C | = 2 L 2 −L 1 , and there is a one-to-one mapping between a codeword in C and a length-(L 2 − L 1 ) binary sequence.
For any message v, the source selects the corresponding codeword c m in C, and then it generates a random bit sequence of length L 2 − L 1 , which is mapped to one codeword b m in C . Before transmission, the source S calculates the nested lattice codeword as
where u is a dither vector uniformly distributed over V 1 and a m = (c m + b m ) mod 1 . Finally, x s is transmitted with average power P s .
C. Modulo Operation at R
After the first phase transmission, the relay R receives y r = h 1 x s + h 2 x d + n r . Instead of forwarding y r directly as in the AF scheme, the relay scales the received signal 3 and reduces it modulo 1 , i.e.,
where u 1 is another random dither vector uniformly distributed over V 1 and is known by all the nodes, and β is chosen as P s P s +σ 2 /g 1 to minimize interference at the destination as explained later.
According to the lemma in [24] , x r is also uniformly distributed over V 1 and its average power is P s . Then, the relay can directly forward the resulting signal x r to the destination D, since it is assumed to have the same transmit power constraint P s as the source.
D. Lattice Decoding at D
After receiving the signal y d of (2), the destination D exploits inflated lattice decoding [24] . Specifically, D multiplies the received signal by a coefficient α, and then cancels both the self-interference x d and the dither vector u, u 1 as
where α and β are selected to minimize the power of the residual interference plus noise. By substituting (2) and (6) into (7), and applying processing similar to that in [24] and [26] , we can rewrite y as
where the residual interference plus noise becomes
with an upper bound on the variance of (1 −α) 2 P s +(1 −β) 2 P s +α 2 σ 2 /g 2 +β 2 σ 2 /g 1 . We then select α and β to minimize this upper bound on the variance. 4 It is easy to see that the optimal values of the scaling factors are α = P s P s +σ 2 /g 2 and β = P s P s +σ 2 /g 1 . As a result, the equivalent noise variance of the post-modulo signal at D becomes
and we ignore the trivial case of σ 2 e = P s hereafter for simplicity.
Then, the decoder at the destination can use Euclidean lattice decoding to decode a m aŝ a m = Q V (y) mod 1 .
(10) a m can then be mapped to the random sequence and the confidential message v directly.
As proved in [24] , the error probability Pr(a m =â m ) goes to zero as long as the total transmission rate R d = L 2 /L is less than the direct channel capacity C d = 1 2 log(P s /σ 2 e ). We use C r = 1 2 log(1 + g 1 P s /(g 2 P d + σ 2 )) to denote the channel capacity for the untrusted relay (with interference). According to the nested lattice encoding, the confidential message corresponds to a fine lattice and the random sequence corresponds to a coarse lattice 0 . The detection of the fine lattice is always harder than that of the coarse lattice. As in [10] , let the rate of the coarse lattice ((L 2 − L 1 )/L) be no less than C r , and the untrusted relay can at most obtain the coarse lattice information (the random sequence) and cannot obtain any information about the fine lattice (the confidential message v). In this way, we can achieve confidential transmission as long as the confidential rate
Decreasing the power of the effective signal y r / h 1 from P s + g 2 g 1 P d + σ 2 g 1 to P s by modulo operation, the MF scheme can substantially improve the performance of the untrusted relay channel. The performance improvement of MF is analyzed in the next two sections.
IV. SECRECY CAPACITY ANALYSIS WITH FULL CSIT
In this section, we analyze the capacity performance on the untrusted relay channel, in terms of the secrecy capacity and the generalized secure degrees of freedom, under the assumption of full CSIT. This section consists of four parts: Part A presents the definitions of secrecy rate and generalized secure degrees of freedom; Part B presents upper bounds for the secrecy rate and G-SDoF for any forwarding protocol; Part C calculates the achievable secrecy rate and G-SDoF of the MF scheme; and finally Part D provides a comparison with the AF and DF forwarding schemes.
A. Secrecy Rate and G-SDoF
When the channel varies slowly and the channel information can be fed back to the transmitter, all the channel information can be pre-known by the transmitter. In this case, the transmitter can carefully select the confidential message rate R s and the total message rate R d respectively, such that the confidential message is correctly and securely transmitted to the destination at the maximal rate. In this case, the achievable secrecy capacity region has been derived in [2] and is given by
where C d and C r are the channel capacities from the source to the destination (via the relay) and from the source to the relay, respectively. In the case of full CSIT, therefore, the secrecy capacity is the most important factor indicating the system performance.
In the high SNR region, degrees of freedom is a good metric to analyze the system rate performance. Analogous to the definition of generalized degrees of freedom in [27] , we further define the generalized secure degrees of freedom as
where S N R is defined as P s /σ 2 and ρ = log(I N R)/ log(S N R), with I N R = P d /σ 2 being the interference-tonoise ratio.
B. Upper Bound on Secrecy Rate and G-SDoF
We firstly present an upper bound on the secrecy rate for any possible forwarding protocol and processing at the relay node. As proved in [2] and [3] , the secrecy rate for a wiretap channel is upper bounded by [C d − C r ] + . In our twophase transmission model, the direct channel capacity, C d is upper bounded by the smaller one of the two-hop channel capacities based on the cut-set bound, which is
. 5 On the other hand, the capacity of the relay channel, C r = 1 2 log(1 + g 1 P s g 2 P d +σ 2 ), is achievable with properly selected lattices. As a result, an upper bound on the secrecy rate for this two-hop channel is given by
We secondly present an upper bound for the G-SDoF. Substituting the upper bound in (13) into the definition in (12), we can easily obtain an upper bound on the G-SDoF as
The G-SDoF must be no more than the generalized degrees of freedom without a security constraint, which is at most 1/2 in our two-hop single antenna system due to the two-phase transmission. And this best secure DoF may be achieved when the transmission power of the destination is no less than that of the source, as shown in (14) .
C. Achievable Secrecy Rate and G-SDoF With MF
We now calculate the achievable secrecy rate and G-SDoF for the modulo-and-forward scheme.
1) Achievable Secrecy Rate: With reference to (9), a good nested lattice code can achieve the following rate to the destination: 5 In our system, we assume half duplex transceivers and non-existance of a direct link. Therefore, a two-phase transmission is necessary. In the first phase, the flow rate from set {S} to set {R, D} is upper bounded by log(1 + g 1 From (1), we can compute the maximum information obtained by the relay. With the assumption that the relay knows all the nested lattice codebook information and the channel state information to detect the transmitted information, the maximal rate is
Then, the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed moduloand-forward scheme is given by
From (17), we can see that the artificial noise power P d only helps to improve the secrecy rate with almost no detrimental effect on the direct transmission from S to D in our modulo-and-forward scheme. When P d goes to infinity, R s can approach the upper bound of 1 2 log 1 2 + P s σ 2 g 1 g 2 g 1 +g 2 . Therefore, the MF scheme solves the interference power dilemma of the AF scheme.
We now calculate the gap between the upper bound and the achievable rate in the non-trivial regime, i.e., U > 0 and R s > 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that g 1 ≤ g 2 . Then, we obtain the gap as
which goes to zero as g 1 /g 2 goes to zero in the high SNR region. In other words, when the ratio between the two-hop channel gains, g 1 and g 2 , becomes very large or small, the achievable rate of the modulo-and-forward scheme approaches the upper bound for small noise variance. In summary, we have the following theorem, Theorem 1: The modulo-and-forward scheme achieves a secrecy rate R s (17) , which is within one-half bit of the secrecy capacity for all channel realizations. 6 2) Achievable G-SDoF: Now we characterize the G-SDoF of the MF scheme. Substituting (17) into the definition of G-SDoF in (12), we have
As the equation above. Hence we can conclude that S D m f (ρ) = S D u (ρ) exactly. Thus, we have the following theorem, Theorem 2: The modulo-and-forward scheme achieves the full generalized secrecy degrees of freedom for the untrusted relay channel.
D. Comparison With AF and DF Schemes
This subsection compares the MF scheme with the AF/DF scheme in terms of secrecy rate and the generalized secure degrees of freedom.
1) Secrecy Rate Comparison With AF: For the AF scheme, the relay node will amplify the received signal in (1) with a coefficient τ = P s /(g 1 P s + g 2 P d + σ 2 ) before sending it to the destination D. As a result, the destination receives the signal
Since the destination has full knowledge of x d and the channel coefficients, it can completely remove the selfinterference term τ h 2 2 x d , and the resulting SNR of the target signal becomes
Then, we can calculate the secrecy rate of the traditional AF scheme as [28 ]
By comparing R AF with R s in (17) , it is easy to verify that the secrecy rate of the MF scheme, R s , is always larger than that of the traditional AF scheme. Specifically, consider the case in which σ 2 → 0 and P d → ∞, with P d * σ 2 and other parameters constant. Then R AF in (22) is a constant while the rate R s in (17) increases without bound. In other words, the improvement of the MF scheme over the AF scheme can be arbitrarily large.
In Fig. 2 , we plot the achievable secrecy rate of the MF and AF schemes, as well as the upper bound in (13) versus transmission power P d . In particular, we set g 1 = g 2 = 1, P s = √ P d and σ = 1. The figure verifies that the rate of the MF scheme and the upper bound increase with the transmission power, and their gap is always less than 1/2. On the other hand, the rate of the AF scheme approaches a constant of 1/2.
2) G-SDoF Comparison With AF:
Since the rate gap between the MF and the AF schemes can be arbitrarily large in the high SNR region, their G-SDoF should be different. Here, we calculate the G-SDoF of the AF scheme to make a comparison. According to the definition in (12) and the AF rate in (22) , we can calculate the G-SDoF of the AF scheme as follows:
S D a f (ρ)
We plot the G-SDoF of AF and MF in Fig. 3 for an intuitive comparison. With reference to (22) , its first term,
, is a decreasing function of P d while the second term, − 1 2 log 1 + P s g 1 P d g 2 +σ 2 , is an increasing function of P d . Hence, the destination needs to carefully select an optimal value of P d to maximize the rate R a f if all the channel information is also available at the destination (this is the interference power dilemma). In the high SNR regime, P d is easier to calculate with reference to (23), i.e., P d and P s should have the same order (ρ = 1).
3) Comparison With DF:
In the AF and MF schemes, only symbol level time synchronization is required at the multiple access phase. Currently, there is no capacity approaching DF scheme under this assumption. In this part, we compare the MF scheme with the lattice based DF scheme in [20] , where perfect phase, amplitude and time synchronization between the interfering signal and the source signal is assumed.
With reference to [20] , setting h 1 = h 2 , and P s = P d , the achievable rate of the lattice DF scheme is
With the same channel coefficients, the MF scheme can also achieve a larger secure rate even without such a strict synchronization requirement. The secrecy rate improvement can be calculated as
where t = P s g 1 /σ 2 is the receiver side SNR. From (24), we can see that the gap will always be larger than zero for the non-trivial case. The numerical results are shown in Fig. 4 . For the low SNR region, the improvement of the MF scheme could be significant since R s /R d f can goes to infinity. 7
V. OUTAGE PERFORMANCE WITHOUT CSIT
In this section, we analyze the connection outage and secrecy outage performance of the MF scheme under the assumption of only receiver side channel state information. Specifically, this section consists of four parts: Part A presents the formulation of connection and secrecy outage probabilities, as well as the generalized secure diversity; Parts B and C calculate a lower bound and the achievable probability for the outage probabilities, as well as the secure diversity; and Part D provides a comparison with the AF scheme. 7 The achievable rate in [20] may be further improved with a better bounding technique. However, the MF scheme should outperform it at least in the low SNR region.
A. Outage Probabilities and Diversity
The metrics of secrecy capacity and secrecy outage have been widely investigated to measure the performance of various schemes. However, they are not appropriate when the transmitter has no channel state information. In many cases, such as the fast fading case [29] , even the state information of the source-destination channel is difficult to obtain at the transmitter. Of course, with an untrusted channel state information provider, such as the relay in our system model, other issues arise.
Without any CSIT, both the direct channel rate R d and the secrecy rate R s must be determined before transmission. Thus, there is always the possibility of unsuccessful transmissions. There are of two types of unsuccessful transmissions to consider: (1) secrecy outage, in which the eavesdropper obtains some information about the confidential message; and (2) connection outage, in which the destination fails to detect the random sequence and confidential message. We use the C-S outage (connection outage and secrecy outage) probability to measure the system secure performance [7] . We formulate the C-S performance as follows.
1) Outage Probabilities Formulation: To discuss the outage probabilities, we define three events: (1) E A : secrecy outage occurs at the relay and no connection outage occurs at the destination; (2) E B : connection outage occurs at the destination and no secrecy outage occurs at the relay; and (3) E C : both connection outage and secrecy outage occur.
A connection outage event occurs when the receiver cannot correctly decode the received message. The connection outage probability can be written as
A secrecy outage event occurs when the eavesdropper can obtain some information about the confidential message. This event happens when the total information the eavesdropper can retrieve from the received message is more than the entropy of the random sequence. So, the secrecy outage probability can be written as
Both p c,out and p s,out are of interest in this paper since the connection outage and secrecy outage may be of different severities in various scenarios. For a given R s , there is a tradeoff between the connection outage probability and secrecy outage probability, since a large R d will decrease the secrecy outage probability while increasing the connection outage probability, and vice versa.
2) Definition of G-SDG: In the high SNR region, diversity order is a simple metric to characterize the system performance. We now define the generalized secure diversity gain. Similar to the generalized diversity gain defined in [30] , the G-SDG is defined as
where S N R = P s /σ 2 , ρ = log(I N R)/ log(S N R) is defined the same as for the G-SDoF in (12) , and p t is the total outage
B. Bounds on Outage Probabilities and Diversity Orders
This section develops a lower bound on the connection outage probability, an expression for the secrecy outage probability, and an upper bound on the G-SDG, for any possible processing at the relay node.
1) Lower Bound on Connection Outage: With reference to the definition in (25) , a lower bound on the connection outage probability can be obtained when the direct channel capacity C d is replaced with its upper bound 1 2 log(1 + min {g 1 , g 2 }P s /σ 2 ). Then, we have a lower bound on the connection outage probability as p lb c,out = Pr
where γ o = 2 2R d − 1 is the SNR threshold associated with connection outage. We further derive p lb c,out as
where the last equation is obtained by noting the probability density functions f g 1 
2) Expression for the Secrecy Outage:
The secrecy outage does not depend on the processing at the relay node. Therefore, we do not need to provide a bound, but rather can deal with the exact outage probability. With the secrecy outage probability definition in (26), we derive an analytical expression for the secrecy outage probability as follows:
where γ s = 2 2(R d −R s ) −1 is the secrecy outage SNR threshold. We further write p s,out as
Applying the probability density functions f g 1 (x) = 1 ε 1 e 
By applying the approximation e x 1 + x for small values of |x| again, we arrive at an asymptotic expression for the secrecy outage probability with high transmit power P s , namely
3) Upper Bound on G-SDG: According to the definition, an outage event occurs when either a secrecy outage or a connection outage occurs. Therefore, we have a lower bound on the total outage probability:
With the generalized secure diversity gain defined in (27) = min 1, lim sup
Ifρ > 2.
(35)
C. Achievable Outage Probabilities and Diversity
In this subsection, we first derive the achievable probabilities p c,out and p s,out with the MF scheme, separately. With these probabilities, we then obtain the achievable generalized secure diversity gain of the MF scheme. Since the achievable p s,out is the same as the expression in (32), we focus on the calculation of p c,out .
1) Achievable Connection Outage Probability: The achievable connection outage probability can be written as
where γ 1 = γ o − 1/2 and K 1 (x) denotes the first-order modified Bessel function of the second kind, and the derivation from (36) to (37) is given in Appendix A. By applying the approximation of K 1 (x) 1
x and e x 1+x for small values of |x|, we arrive at an asymptotic expression for the connection outage probability with high transmit power P s as
2) Tradeoff Between Achievable p c,out and p s,out : With reference to (32) and (37), we see that the two probabilities are not independent. An increase in p c,out ( p s,out ) will lead to a decrease in p s,out ( p c,out ), which is a tradeoff mentioned in [7] . With the given tradeoff, it would be interesting to carefully design the rates R s , R d and the powers P s , P d to minimize the connection outage and secrecy outage probabilities. In the following Fig. 5 , we plot the tradeoff between the connection outage and secrecy outage probabilities for a typical setting.
In the high SNR regime with large P s /σ 2 , the tradeoff between the two probabilities is simpler. Substituting (38) into (33), we obtain an explicit relation between p s,out and p c,out as
3) Achievable G-SDG: In this section, we first give an upper bound and a lower bound on the total outage probability of the MF scheme. Fortunately, both bounds lead to the same G-SDG, which is also the best diversity gain in theory. a) Upper bound and lower bound for achievable p t : It is difficult to directly calculate the total outage probability due to the dependence between p c,out and p s,out . Therefore, we analyze an upper bound and lower bound on the total outage probability, with the MF scheme. According to the definition, we can obtain an upper bound:
On the other hand, either secrecy outage or connection outage means the outage of the transmission. Therefore, we have a lower bound:
We can see that the lower bound is one-half of the upper bound.
b) Achievable G-SDG: With the generalized secure diversity gain defined in (27) , the diversity gain is the same for both the upper bound and the lower bound on p t since they only differ by a constant coefficient, and it can be calculated as follows:
By comparing the upper bound on G-SDG in (35) and the achievable G-SDG in (42), we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3: The modulo-and-forward scheme achieves the full generalized secrecy diversity gain for the untrusted relay channel. 
D. Comparison With AF Scheme
This section compares the outage performance of the AF scheme with that of the MF scheme. 8 Since the secrecy outage probability is independent of the forwarding strategy at the relay, we need only to calculate the connection outage probability of the AF scheme, p AF c,out . From the received end-to-end SNR expression for AF relaying, we can derive the connection outage probability as p AF c,out = Pr
Ps
where the derivation from (43) to (44) is provided in Appendix B. In Fig. 5 , we plot the outage probability performance of the AF scheme and the MF scheme, where we set P s = P d = 10, ε 1 = ε 2 = σ 2 = 1, R s = 1/2, and R d varies from 1/2 to 15. We can see that there is a tradeoff between the connection outage and secrecy outage probabilities for both AF and MF schemes. However, the connection outage probability of the MF scheme is almost half that of the AF scheme with the same R d , indicating that MF is much more attractive for data transmission.
Secondly, we calculate the outage diversity gain of the AF scheme. When the SNR goes to infinity, p AF c,out goes to zero only when ρ ≤ 2. In this case, the asymptotic expression can be written as Similar to (42), we can calculate the outage diversity of the AF scheme as
Obviously, the maximum outage diversity of the AF scheme is 1/2, which is only half of that of the MF scheme. Moreover, this diversity of 1/2 is achieved only when ρ = 3/2, which requires very strict power control at the destination. These phenomena can be numerically observed in Fig. 6 , where a comparison of generalized secure diversity gains of the AF and the MF schemes is plotted.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the untrusted relay channel. Inspired by the MLAN channel, we have proposed a modulo operation before forwarding by the relay, at which a lattice encoded confidential message from the source and Gaussian distributed artificial noise from the destination are superimposed. By doing so, the artificial noise only helps to protect the confidential message from eavesdropping at the untrusted relay, with almost no detrimental effect of wasting relay power. For the case with full CSIT, we have shown that the proposed MF scheme approaches the secrecy capacity within 1/2 bit for any channel realization, hence achieving full generalized secure degrees of freedom. For the case without CIST, we have shown that the proposed MF scheme achieves the full generalized secure diversity gain of 1. On the other hand, the traditional AF scheme only achieves a G-SDG of 1/2 at most. APPENDIX A DERIVATION OF EQ. (37) From (36), we can write the achievable connection outage probability as p c,out = Pr P s σ 2
where γ 1 = 2 2R d − 1/2 is the target SNR threshold. We can further write p o as
Considering the two cases of g 2 ≤ γ 1 σ 2 P s and g 2 > γ 1 σ 2 P s , we can rewrite p c,out as
Applying the probability density functions f g 1 
ε 2 in the above equation, we can obtain an analytical expression for the outage probability as
Thus, we have (37).
APPENDIX B DERIVATION OF EQ. (44)
From (43), we can write the connection outage probability of AF relaying as 
Ps ε 1 · (Ps +P d )g 2 +σ 2
Ps g 2 −γo σ 2 dg 2 .
Using the variable substitution of x = g 2 − γ o σ 2 P s , we can obtain a closed-form expression for the connection outage probability for the AF relaying as [31] p AF c,out = 1 − e − γo σ 2
In this way, the proof of (44) has been completed. 
